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John	R.	Smythies’	Theories	of	
Mind,	Matter,	and	N-Dimensional	Space	
	
Conspectus	of	part	of	his	Analysis	of	Perception	(1956)	
	
—	Peter	Sjöstedt-H	—	
MMXVIII	
	
	
John	 Raymond	 Smythies	 (b.	 1922)	 is	 a	 neuroscientist	 and	 philosopher	 of	mind,	 cousin	 to	
Richard	Dawkins	and	Graham	Greene.	The	following	is	a	summary	of	his	ideas	on	phenomenal	
space	 –	 the	 space	 of	 one’s	 imagination,	 dreams,	 psychedelic	 experiences,1	 somatic	
sensations,	visions,	hynagogia,	etc.	–	and	its	relation	to	physical	space.	
	
	
– ‘(visual	and	somatic)	sense-data	really	are	spatial	entities.’	(p.	13)	
o [This	 is	 in	 contradistinction	 to	 the	 common	 Cartesian	 belief	 that	 the	
fundamental	 difference	 between	matter	 and	mind	 is	 that	matter	 is	 spatial	
(extended)	and	mind	is	non-spatial	(unextended).]	
§ 'Descartes	made	the	mistake	of	confusing	a	part	of	the	mind	(the	Ego	
and	its	thoughts)	with	the	whole	mind.'	(p.	58)	
• [William	James	made	a	similar	point	earlier	(1904).]	
o Smythies	uses	‘sense-data’	synonymously	with	‘sensation’,	which	he	also	(p.	
10)	defines	as	that	which	changes	in	an	‘experiential	event’	(e).	
	
– Smythies	 writes	 that	 visual	 sensations	 [such	 as	 imagining	 two	 triangles	
simultaneously]	are	spatial	considering	the	fact	that	they	have	spatial	properties	and	
relations	–	thus	(non-exhaustively):	
o Sensations/sense-data	 ‘may	 be	 inside	 or	 outside	 other	 sense-data	 in	 a	
topological	sense	…	.	In	general	sense-data	may	satisfy	many	of	the	axioms	and	
theorems	of	topology.’	(p.	10)	
§ ‘Topology’:	 ‘A	 term	 meaning	 ‘science	 of	 place’	 …	 .	 The	 branch	 of	
mathematics	concerned	with	those	properties	of	figures	and	surfaces	
which	are	 independent	of	size	and	shape	and	are	unchanged	by	any	
deformation	that	is	continuous,	neither	creating	new	points	nor	fusing	
existing	ones;	hence,	with	those	of	abstract	spaces	that	are	invariant	
under	homœomorphic	transformations.’		(Oxford	English	Dictionary)	
o ‘Two	sense-data	may	share,	 in	part,	a	common	boundary—i.e.	they	may	be	
contiguous	…	[or]	non-contiguous.’	(pp.	10–11)	
o ‘Some	sense-data	…	may	be	held	to	be	“punctuate”	and	not	extended.	Even	if	
so,	and	it	is	a	debatable	point	[!],	such	sense-data	can	be	located	…	and	bear	
spatial	relations	to	other	sense-data…’	(p.	11)	
																																																						
1	At	the	start	of	Aldous	Huxley‘s	seminal	book	on	psychedelics,	The	Doors	of	Perception	(1954),	he	writes	that	‘at	least	one	
professional	philosopher	has	taken	mescalin	for	the	light	it	may	throw	on	such	ancient,	unsolved	riddles	as	the	place	of	mind	
in	nature	and	the	relationship	between	brain	and	consciousness’.	The	footnote	here	refers	to	John	R.	Smythies,	and	mentions	
his	paper	of	1953,	‘The	Mescaline	Phenomena’.	
	 2	
o Individual	sense-data	are	parts	of	the	total	visual	field,	and	their	location	can	
be	‘divided	into	sections—i.e.	two	hemispheres—right	and	left,	or	upper	and	
lower;	or	four	quadrants;	or	into	a	central	region	and	a	peripheral	region;	etc.’	
(p.	12)	
o 	‘Sense-data	also	have	shapes	and	(relative)	sizes	and	may	even	be	subjected	
to	a	form	of	measurement	…	[and]	an	area’’	(p.	13)	
	
– Smythies	next	asks	(with	thought	to	mind	and	matter),	‘How,	in	general,	can	a	class	of	
events	a	be	related	to	a	class	of	events	b?	There	are	five	possible	answers.’	(p.	14)	
	
i.		 Identity	of	a	and	b	 	 	 (a=b)	
ii.		 a	as	a	proper	subset	of	b	 	 (b	(a)		)	
iii.		 b	as	a	proper	subset	of	a	 	 (a	(b)		)	
iv.		 a	and	b	intersect	 	 	 (a	()	b)	
v.		 a	and	b	as	mutually	exclusive		 (a)		(b)	
	
– How	then	may	the	class	of	events	e	[experiential	events]	be	related	to	the	class	of	
events	p	[physical	events]?	
o [That	is	the	question!	The	mind-body	problem/hard	problem	of	consciousness]	
	
– 1.	&	2.	Smythies	writes	that	we	‘can	say	at	once	that	e	and	p	cannot	be	identical,	nor	
can	p	be	a	proper	subset	of	e’	(p.	15).	[I.e.	not	i	or	ii]	
o i.e.	not	naïve	realism		[nor	idealism].	
o Not	naïve	realism	because	the	temporal	index	of	a	physical	event	such	as	star	
light-to-eye	is	non-identical	to	the	temporal	index	of	its	perception.	
§ [Smythies	 promotes	 a	 representationalist	 theory	 of	 perception,	 but	
that	is,	in	my	view,	ultimately	irrelevant	to	his	views	on	spatiality.]	
§ [He	 does	 not	 explain	 why	 2.	 (idealism)	 cannot	 be	 the	 case,	 though	
dismisses	it	in	passing	on	p.	30.]	
	
– 3.	Smythies	next	considers	the	relation	of	p	and	e	under	relation	iii	(e	as	proper	subset	
of	p).	He	writes	that	this	 ‘is	 the	theory	of	psycho-neural	 identity	theory	which	has	
been	largely	abandoned	by	neorologists’	(p.	16).	
o [This	 statement	 itself	 is	 of	 interest	 because	 it	 is	 commonly	 held	 that	 the	
psycho-neural	identity	theory	was	first	advanced	in	1956	(by	U.	T.	Place),	but	
that	is	the	year	of	this	very	book	of	Smythies	who	already	rejects	it.]	
o [Psycho-neural	identity	theory	(PN-IdT)	is	the	idea	that	a	sensation	simply	(and	
strictly)	 is	 its	 ‘correlated’	brain	process.	 That	 the	 two	 terms	have	 the	 same	
referent,	as	do	the	‘morning	star’	and	‘evening	star’	(i.e.	Venus).]	
o [It	may	 be	wondered	why	 Smythies	 considers	 PN-IdT	 as	 relation	 3	 (subset)	
rather	 than	 relation	 1	 (identity),	 considering	 its	 name	 and	 purport.	 But	
Smythies	 is	 fundamentally	 correct	 in	 this	 classification	because	PN-IdT	does	
not	take	mind	and	matter	to	be	identical	but	rather	it	eliminates	mind	to	leave	
matter	as	fundamental	(i.e.	e	as	subset	of	p),	thereby	really	forfeiting	its	right	
to	call	itself	an	‘identity’	theory.	(See	my	PhD	thesis,	chapter	4	for	details.)]	
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o Smythies	then	uses	the	reality	of	the	phenomenal	space	he	described	above	
against	PN-IdT:	
§ ‘Two	groups	of	events	arranged	in	a	spatial	order	may	not	be	said	to	be	
identical	 unless	 they	 are	 geometrically	 congruent.	 …	 [E]vents	 in	 the	
cerebral	 cortex	 …	 concerned	 in	 a	 particular	 perception	 are	
geometrically	non-congruent	with	the	sense-data	that	these	events	are	
alleged,	 under	 this	 [identity]	 theory,	 to	 be.	 …	 [This]	 can	 be	 used	 to	
refute	with	equal	finality	the	theory	of	psycho-neural	identity.’	(p.	16)	
	
– 4.	e	and	p	cannot	intersect	because	at	the	intersection	e	and	p	would	be	identical	(i.e.	
have	the	same	referent),	which,	as	we	saw	above	cannot	be	correct.	
	
– 5.	Smythies	does	not	use	the	term	dualism,	and	as	we	shall	see	this	is	fair.	He	begins	
by	stating:	
	
o A	physical	(p)	spatial	location	can	be	determined	by	‘a	system	of	co-ordinate	
axes	OX,	OY,	OZ	set	at	right	angles	to	each	other’	and	with	time	(OT)	(p.	23).	As	
we	saw	with	phenomenal	spatiality,	(e)	can	also	have	axes	for	location:	‘sense-
data	can	certainly	be	located	by	using	a	set	of	co-ordinates’	(pp.	23–4)	
o 	Smythies	 then	writes	 that	 the	 ‘location	of	 sense-data	 is	only	quantitatively	
different	and	not	qualitatively	different	from	the	location	of	physical	objects,	
which	we	saw	was	also	true	in	the	case	of	measurements	of	sense-data	and	
physical	objects’	(p.	24).	
§ That	is,	though	the	phenomenal	spatial	location	using	a	set	of	axes	may	
not	 be	 accurately	 determinable,	 this	 is	 neither	 the	 case	 in	 physical	
space.	Location	here	is	a	matter	of	degree	not	of	kind.	
	
– Now,	a	fundamental	question	is	asked:	
o ‘what	are	the	spatial	relations	between	these	two	sets	of	spatial	axes	at	any	
time	instant?’	(p.	25)	
o There	are	only	two	possible	answers	he	writes:	
§ Theory	I:	‘There	may	be	no	spatial	relations	between	the	two	sets	of	
axes.’	(p.	25)	
§ Theory	 II:	 ‘The	two	sets	may	be	conjoined	to	determine	a	single	six-
dimensional	manifold.’	(p.	25)	
o i.e.	Is	phenomenal	space	separate	from	physical	space	[a	position	taken	by,	
e.g.,	H.	H.	Price,	A.	N.	Whitehead	and	Bertrand	Russell],	or	is	it	conjoined	in	a	
single	higher	dimensional	space?	
	
– If	we	delve	deeper,	we	can	fathom	a	further	division	of	possibilities:	
o I:	that	each	individual	has	their	own	separate	phenomenal	space,	in	which	case	
we	must	(for	phenomenal	space)	‘use	(m	+	1)	sets	of	co-ordinate	axes	in	the	
case	of	m	human	individuals	(with	three	spatial	[and	one	temporal	axis]	in	each	
set)’	(p.	25).		
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§ [It	 is	 not	 explained	 why	 the	 variable	 ‘human’	 is	 mentioned	 (as	
presumably	other	organisms	can	have	phenomenal	space).]	
§ Thus	if	there	were	100	people	in	the	universe,	then	there	would	be	100	
three-dimension	axes	 for	the	phenomenal	spaces,	plus	one	common	
physical	3D	space	(and	one	temporal	dimension	common	to	all).	
• In	 a	 footnote	 here	 (p.	 25)	 Smythies	 acknowledges	 the	
disputability	 of	 assuming	 that	 only	 one	 temporal	 dimension	
could	be	common	to	all	phenomenal	spaces	–	it	is	‘beyond	the	
scope	of	 this	book’.	 In	other	words,	 it	 could	be	 the	case	 that	
separate	 phenomenal	 spaces	 have	 temporal	 dimensions	
incongruent	with	other	phenomenal	and	physical	spaces.	[This	
is	 something	 considered	 in,	 e.g.,	 A.	 N.	 Whitehead’s	 essay	
‘Uniformity	and	Contingency’,	in	relation	to	dream	time	and	the	
theories	of	Relativity.]	
o In	this	case	(I),	‘All	these	worlds	[‘world	≡	spatial	system’	(p.25)]	would	be	quite	
separate	and	their	contents	would	be	held	to	bear	no	spatial	relations	to	each	
other	 but	 only	 temporal	 relations,	 causal	 relations	 and	 relations	 of	 class	
membership’	(p.	25).	
	
– II:	Alternatively,	it	may	be	the	case	that	the	phenomenal	worlds	are	not	separate	but	
that	‘the	contents	of	each	world	[including	the	physical]	…	are	spatially	related’	(p.	25)	
–	(i.e.	as	well	as	related	temporally,	causally,	and	taxonomically).	
o In	this	case,	rather	than	(m	+	1)	sets	of	axes,	there	would	be	‘a	single	(3m	+	3)	
dimensional	manifold’	(p.	25).	(Or	a	[4m	+	4]	spatiotemporal	manifold,	if	we	
include	time	as	a	dimension.)	
§ i.e.	(3-dimensions	x	number	of	individuals)	+	(3	dimensions	of	physical	
space)	as	one	single	spatial	manifold.	
§ [Note	 that	 it	 is	 assumed	 here	 the	 phenomenal	 space	 is	 three-
dimensional.	 That	 it	 may	 be	 two-dimensional	 is	 an	 issue	 Smythies	
addresses	(and	rejects)	in	later	papers.]	
	
– ‘In	either	case	[I	or	II]	we	are	dealing	with	a	far-reaching	development	in	cosmology	…	
there	is	not	one	Space-Time	(as	is	thought	at	present)	but	…	there	are	many	Space-
Times.’	(p.	27)	
– In	summary	of	this	section	Smythies	writes:	
o ‘In	[I]	the	physical	universe	becomes	but	one	of	many	spatial	universes	in	which	
events	ordered	in	a	spatio-temporal	system	occur.	In	[II]	the	physical	universe	
becomes	merely	a	section	of	the	total	spatio-temporal	Universe	of	events.	…	
Thus	to	give	a	proper	account	of	experiential	events	and	their	relation	to	brain	
events,	we	may	have	to	exchange	the	four-dimensional	geometry	in	current	
use	in	cosmology	for	an	n-dimensional	geometry.’	(p.	27)	
§ ‘n	=	(3m	+	3)’	(p.	28)	
o Summarized	further:	
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– The	two	formal	cosmological	theories	are:	
	
o THEORY	 I:	 ‘Sense-data	 ...	are	spatial	entities	distinct	 from	physical	objects	
and	bear	temporal	and	causal	relations	but	no	spatial	relations	to	physical	
objects.’	(p.	27)	–	i.e.	the	exclusive	theory.	
	
o THEORY	II:	 ‘Sense	data	…	are	spatial	entities	distinct	from	physical	objects	
and	bear	both	temporal	and	causal	relations	and	higher-dimensional	spatial	
relations	to	physical	objects.’	(p.	28)	–	i.e.	the	inclusive	theory.	
	
	
– Smythies	now	defines	a	mind:	
o ‘A	 mind	 is	 a	 complex	 composite	 of	 sense-data	 organised	 into	 sense-fields,	
together	with	images,	thoughts,	affects	and	perhaps	a	Pure	Ego.’	(p.	28)	
§ He	 then	 adds	 that	 the	 ‘mind	 thus	 defined	 is	 a	 part	 of	 the	 total	
organism—an	extra	part	which	we	have	previously	failed	to	recognise	
because	of	its	particular	geographical	location	and	because	some	of	its	
constituent	 parts	 (sense-data)	 have	 been	 confused	 with	 physical	
objects’	(p.	28).	
• That	is	to	say	that	because	an	organism	fundamentally	includes	
its	 mind,	 an	 organism	 is	 a	 higher-dimensional	 entity	 in	 its	
totality,	 such	 that	 a	 four-dimensional	 description	 of	 the	
organism	cannot	be	sufficient.	
• ‘There	 are	 also	 higher-dimensional	 geometries	 available	 to	
describe	 the	 (4m	+	4)-dimensional	 spatio-temporal	 system	of	
Theory	II.’	(p.	29)	
• In	Appendix	I,	Smythies	states	that:	‘There	is	no	a	priori	reason	
why	we	should	not	develop	the	ability	to	appreciate	directly	
an	n-dimensional	spatial	system.’	(p.	124)	(n>3)	
o [Smythies	 mentions	 the	 mescaline	 experience	 in	 this	
book	(p.	47	–	but	only	in	respect	to	H.	H.	Price’s	version	
of	 Theory	 I).	 But	 I	 refer	 interested	 readers	 again	 to	
Smythies’	 1953	paper	 (which	 inspired	Aldous	Huxley’s	
The	 Doors	 of	 Perception	 [1954]),	 ‘The	 Mescaline	
Phenomena’.]	
	
– Smythies	 argues	 that	 both	 these	 theories	 are	 compatible	 with	 psycho-neural	
interaction	 and	 psycho-neural	 parallelism,	 which,	 he	 writes,	 are	 not	 essentially	
different	on	a	Humean	analysis	of	causation.		
o Note	that	‘psycho-neural	interaction’	(p.	29)	is	generally	considered	to	be	the	
causal	operandi	of	dualism	(that	mind	and	body	are	distinct).	But	recall	that	
Smythies	 (in	 Theory	 II)	 is	 advancing	 a	 single	 n-dimensional	manifold,	 i.e.	 a	
monism.	In	fact,	the	very	reality	of	phenomenal	space	is	contrary	to	the	axioms	
of	Cartesian	dualism	(which	denies	extension	to	mental	states).	Against	such	a	
dualism,	Smythies	aims	the	following	remarks:	
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§ ‘[The]	spatiality	of	sense-data	is	given	no	less	than	their	colour.	
§ If	the	mind	is	thought	to	be	non-spatial	how	can	spatial	sense-data	and	
images	belong	to	such	a	mind?	
§ How	can	that	which	is	spatial	belong	to	that	which	is	non-spatial?	
§ How	can	an	entity	be	both	wholly	non-spatial	and	spatial	and	
§ How	can	a	non-spatial	whole	be	composed	of	spatial	parts?’	(p.	30)	
• It	 is	 thus	 interesting	 to	 note	 that	 Smythies	 rejects	 both	 the	
psycho-neural	 identity	 theory	 (a	 theory	 of	 materialism,	 or	
material	monism)	as	well	as	rejecting	the	traditional	theory	of	
dualism.	[So	‘the	physical	is	an	abstraction’]	
• Thus	it	is	a	‘pseudo-dilemma’	to	ask,	“How	can	the	unextended	
and	non-spatial	mind	and	the	extended	brain	interact?”	(p.	30)	
	
[Smythies	now	goes	through	potential	objections	to	this	theory,	and	develops	his	‘television	
theory	of	perception’	–	which	in	this	conspectus	I	shall	omit.]	
	
– Smythies	 refers	 to	 E.	 A.	 Abbott’s	 classic	 novel	 Flatland	 (1926)	 –	 where	 the	 two-
dimensional	 polygon	 people	 cannot	 sufficiently	 perceive	 nor	 imagine	 a	 three-
dimensional	world	–	 	when	Smythies	writes	 ‘there	 is	no	a	priori	 reason	why	 there	
should	not	be	higher-dimensional	spatial	relations	between	sense-data	…	on	the	one	
hand	and	physical	objects	on	the	other.’	(p.	48)	
o Smythies	 points	 to	 Bertrand	 Russell	 on	 this	 possibility,	 specifically	 his	 texts	
Mysticism	 and	 Logic	 (1918)	 and	Human	 Knowledge	 (1948),	 but	 claims	 that	
Russell	tends	towards	Theory	I.	
– Developing	Theories	I	and	II,	Smythies	writes	(p.54):	
o A	is	a	point	in	a	phenomenal	space;	B	is	a	point	in	physical	space.	
o If	Theory	II	is	true,	then:	
§ ‘A	cannot	be	the	same	point	as	B.’		
§ ‘There	will	be	no	line	in	the	physical	world	parallel	to	AB.’	
§ ‘The	 angle	 ABC	 [where	 C	 is	 another	 synchronous	 point	 in	 physical	
space]	will	always	be	a	right	angle.’	(see	below)	
o If	Theory	I	is	true,	then:	
§ ‘There	can	be	no	line	joining	A	to	B.’	
§ ‘There	can	be	no	such	angle	as	ABC’.	
	
– Smythies	 illustrates	 metaphorically	 the	 ‘psychophysical	 geometry’	 of	 Theory	 II	 n-
dimensionality	(in	the	Appendix	II,	p.	127)	by	means	of	a	4D	tesseract:	the	inner	cube	
represents	physical	space	and	six	contiguous	flat-top	pyramids	(which	are	additional	
3D	 cubes	 illustrated	 perspectively)	 represent	 contiguous	 three-dimensional	
phenomenal	spaces	(where	m	=	6).		
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o [Note	that	this	is	a	3D	representation	of	a	4D	object,	which	as	such	cannot	be	
imagined	directly	(at	least	for	most	of	us	without	chemical	assistance).]	
o [But	the	location	of	a	point	in	4D	space	is	easily	represented	algebraically.	For	
the	3	axes	(x,	y,	z)	of	3D-space	we	can	locate	a	point-h	by	3	respective	values	–	
e.g.	(x2,	y3,	z4).	For	4D-space	we	simply	add	another	axis	w:	point-h:(x2,	y3,	z4,	
w5).	And	so	on	for	D>4.	This	representational	method	is	known	as	the	Cartesian	
coordinate	system.]	
o [That	 ‘angle	 ABC	 will	 always	 be	 a	 right	 angle’	 (p.	 54)	 in	 Theory	 II	 is	 not	
elaborated	 upon	 by	 Smythies,	 but	 that	 axes	 x,	 y,	 x	 are	 orthogonal	 to	 one	
another	serves	at	least	inductively	as	reason	for	w	to	be	orthogonal	thereto	
yet	again,	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	such	a	possibility	is	intelligible	for	us	
conceptually	rather	than	prosaically	imaginably.]	
	
– Smythies	now	considers	the	theories	in	relation	to	the	causal	processes	between	the	
mind	and	the	brain	–	represented	by	psi:	ψ	
o [In	the	philosophical	tradition,	we	can	generalize	to	say	that	there	are	three	
main	options	for	such	causation:	
§ non-existent	(if	mind=matter	[strict	identity]	then	no	causal	path;	or	in	
parallelism);		
§ interaction	1	–	matter-to-mind	(emergentism,	epiphenomenalism);	
§ interaction	 2	 –	 mind-to-matter	 (mental	 causation	 [inc.	 free	 will],	 in	
most	emergentism,	dualism,	idealism	[as	projection],	etc.)]	
o Theory	 I:	 non-spatial	 causal	 processes	 ‘crossing	 the	 unimaginable	 void	
between	 the	 public	 physical	 spatial	 system	 and	 each	 private	 experiential	
spatial	system’	(p.	55).	
§ [such	causal	processes	would	 include	 those	hypothesized	 to	exist	by	
the	 transordinal	 nomologies/psychophysical	 bridge	 laws	 of	 the	
emergentists	[e.g.	J.	S.	Mill,	C.D.	Broad].	That	such	laws	are	not	laws	of	
physics	 is	 one	 reason	 for	 the	 rejection	 of	 emergentism	 as	 an	
unscientific	theory	(e.g.	by	J.	J.	C.	Smart	[1959]).]	
o Smythies	 now	 splits	 Theory	 II	 into	 two	 further	 types	 so	 to	 address	 this	ψ		
question:	
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o Theory	II	A:	
§ The	‘psychical	spatial	system’	is	a	term	Smythies	coins	to	refer	to	the	
possibility	 that	 the	phenomenal	 spatial	 field	at	any	specious	present	
transcends	that	which	is	actually	sensed.		
• ‘Each	 private	 sensed	 spatial	 system	 may	 thus	 be	 set	 in	 or	
embedded	 in	 a	 larger	 unsensed	 system	 of	 the	 same	
dimensionality	(i.e.	the	same	set	of	three	spatial	axes…)’	(p.	56)	
• There	could	exist	in	this	theory	‘unsensed	psychical	entites’	(p.	
56).	
• [This	is	a	rather	radical	proposal.	If	we	applied	it	to	phenomenal	
dream	space,	 it	would	mean	 that	 the	dream	world	extended	
beyond	 that	which	 one	 actually	 experienced	 in	 one’s	 dream:	
the	dream	would	be	larger	than	your	experience	of	it.]	
• Further	still,	Smythies	speculates	that	a	‘psychical	mechanism’	
that	 forms	one’s	actual	 sensations	could	 lie	un-sensed	 in	 this	
phenomenal	space,	thus	also	insensible	in	physical	spatiality.	
• In	the	2D	Flatland	(from	Abbott),	the	inhabitants	could	perceive	
a	x-y	boundary,	but	they	would	be	unaware	that	there	was	also	
a	(x-y)-z	connection	(‘interface’).	Likewise,	there	could	be	an	(x-
y-z)-w	interface	for	us:	
o ‘Similarly	our	physical	universe	may	be	separated	from	
each	of	our	private	universes	by	a	dimensional	interface,	
and	our	own	private	universes	may	be	separated	from	
those	of	other	people	by	other	dimensional	interfaces.’	
(p.	57)	
o Smythies	 speculates	 that	 there	 could	 be	
transdimensional	 processes	 [i.e.	 only	 appearing	
systematic	from	a	transdimensional	perspective].	
§ [Just	 as	 3D	 processes	 would	 appear	
unsystematic,	 irregular,	 and	 largely	 obscured	
when	interfacing	a	2D	Flatland.]	
o ‘Normally	 the	 only	 transdimensional	 processes	 are	
conducted	by	ψy	[connections	of	sensory	areas	of	brain	
to	 the	 sense	 fields	 of	 experience]	 and	 ψx	 [process	
whereby	 will	 is	 transmitted	 to	 motor	 cortex],	 which	
correlate	the	phenomena	occurring	in	all	these	worlds.’	
(p.	57)	
o ‘There	 is	no	problem	about	how	such	processes	could	
react	with	the	brain	as	every	point	in	the	brain	can	be	
contiguous	with	the	unsensed	psychical	mechanism.’	(p.	
57)	
§ [i.e.	 via	 the	 (for	 us)	 unsensed	 dimensional	
interface	 between	 physical	 and	 unsensed	
phenomenal	spatiality.]	
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o Theory	II	B:	
§ ‘Sense-data	…	might	still	bear	higher	dimensional	spatial	 relations	to	
physical	objects,	yet	there	would	be	not	any	such	unsensed	psychical	
spatial	system	as	postulated	in	Theory	II	A.’	(pp.	57–8)	
• ‘ψ	would	then	be	a	non-spatial	causal	process	as	described	in	
Theory	I.’	(p.	58)	
• But	in	contradistinction	to	Theory	I,	the	Universe	would	still	be	
a	 single	 (3m	 +	 3)	 dimensional	 one	 rather	 than	 multifarious	
separate	3D	universes.	
• Theory	 II	 B	 would	 have	 to	 stipulate	 ‘a	 non-spatial	 part	
connecting	two	spatial	parts:	the	brain	and	the	sensory	fields’	
(p.	58)	
o i.e.	 a	 causality	 that	 involves	 an	 aspatial	 bridge,	 as	 it	
were.	
o This	is	not	impossible,	Smythies	says,	and	the	competing	
hypotheses	could	be	gauged	in	terms	of	plausibility	via	
empirical	means	based	on	the	different	predictions	that	
the	theories	could	proffer	–	Smythies	speculates.	
	
	
– Smythies	 concludes	 by	 listing	 how	 these	 theories	 are	 advantageous	 to	 Cartesian	
dualism.	
o Such	dualism	cannot	give	an	 intelligible	account	of	the	 interaction	between	
sense-data	and	the	brain.	
o Theories	 I	 &	 II	 both	 view	 an	 organism	 as	 a	unitary	 mind-body	 entity,	 that	
cannot	be	parsed.	In	dualism	the	mind	(soul)	can	live	on	after	the	(3D)	body	
dies.	
o ‘The	 Cartesian	 dualism	 is	 a	 dualism	 of	 substance	 whereas	 the	 theories	
presented	here	are	dualisms	of	spatial	 location.	They	are	however	monistic	
theories	in	the	logical	field	of	causal	relation	and	organisation.’	(p.	59)	
o ‘It	 should	be	possible	 to	 investigate	 causal	 relations	between	a	brain	and	a	
mind	by	constructing	an	“n”-dimensional	physics	based	on	an	“n”-dimensional	
geometry’	(p.	59).	
	
	
– Though	 Smythies	 rejects	 dualism	 it	 should	 be	 recalled	 that	 he	 also	 rejects	 the	
psychoneural	identity	theory.	He	also	rejects,	by	implication	of	the	spatial	argument	
he	sets	forth	above,	emergentist	theories:	
o ‘Nor	do	we	have	to	postulate	that	cerebral	events	“underlie”	mental	events,	
or	form	a	mysterious	“substratum”	for	them’	(p.60)	
§ This	 is	 because	 the	 three-dimensional	 space	 of	 the	 brain	 is	 not	 the	
totality	of	the	space	of	reality,	and	is	not	a	more	fundamental	ontology:	
• ‘it	may	 be	 that	 an	 accurate	 and	 comprehensive	 neurological	
account	 of	 perception	 cannot	 be	 given	 solely	 in	 terms	 of	
physical	 objects	 including	 brains	 and	 the	 language	 system	of	
physics,	but	 it	may	have	to	 include	<sense-datum>	among	 its	
basic	terms’	(p.	60)	
	 10	
Thus	Smythies	offers	hypotheses	of	the	mind-matter	relation	based	on	an	analysis	of	space.	
They	are	certainly	speculative,	but	certainly	speculations	that	can	be	analysed	further	(e.g.	in	
relation	to	possible	multiple	temporal	axes).	It	is	of	note	that	this	book	of	Smythies	begins	
(Prologue,	p.	xiii)	with	a	long	quotation	–	a	suggestion	from	mathematician	and	metaphysician	
A.	N.	Whitehead:	
	
‘How	do	we	know	that	only	one	geometry	is	relevant	to	the	happenings	of	nature?	…	
Perhaps	 in	 the	 dim	 future	 mankind,	 if	 it	 then	 exists,	 will	 look	 back	 to	 the	 queer,	
contracted	 three-dimensional	 universe	 from	which	 the	 nobler,	 wider	 existence	 has	
emerged.’		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
											(Modes	of	Thought)	
	
–	–	–	
